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MCBEE V. JIM HOGG COUNTY: ON BALANCE A RISKY BUSINESS
There are fewer than 6,000 people in Jim Hogg County, Texas.
Five years ago, newly elected Sheriff Gilbert Ybanez decided not to
rehire Deputies Contreras, Hinojosa, Serna, Spencer, and McBee. De-
puties Contreras, Hinojosa, and Serna had openly supported the previous
sheriff during the election by attending pachangas (local political rallies),
placing bumper stickers on their automobiles, and publicly endorsing
the incumbent. Deputy Spencer had supported the losing incumbent by
placing a bumper sticker on her automobile. Ybanez offered Deputy
McBee a lower position than she had previously held; the offer was
withdrawn after McBee privately complained to county officials about
Ybanez's treatment of the other four deputies. The five deputies filed
suit in Federal District Court' claiming that Sheriff Ybanez's failure to
reappoint them violated their First Amendment rights.2 The United States
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that both the district court decision
and the original Fifth Circuit panel decision applied the wrong test. The
court held that the proper test was a particularized balancing of the
deputies' interest as public employees in freedom of expression, and the
sheriff's interest as governmental employer in operating an efficient
office. The court vacated and remanded, instructing the district court
to apply this new test to the facts of each deputy's case. McBee v. Jim
Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984).
This casenote will first briefly survey the United States Supreme
Court decisions in the areas of speech and political patronage. Next the
three opinions in the McBee en banc decision will be compared, followed
by a brief discussion of the standards adopted by other Federal Circuits.
Finally a suggested approach to political patronage cases is presented.
Relevant Supreme Court Cases
The last century has seen an ebb and flow in the Constitutional
protection given to public employees' activities and even to their beliefs.
* Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Deputies Contreras, Hinjosa, Serna, Spencer, and McBee filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1979). The First Amendment, applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, protects political association and expression. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632-33 (1976). However, under Texas law, deputy sheriffs
are closely linked to the sheriff, serving at his pleasure and leaving with him when his
term ends. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6869 (Vernon 1960).
2. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 587, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2697 (1972) (An
individual has no "right" to a valuable public benefit; although he or she may be denied
the benefit for virtually any reason, the government may not deny the benefit for a
reason that infringes the individual's constitutionally protected interests).
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Just over thirty years ago the United States Supreme Court upheld the
traditional view that public employees could "go elsewhere" if they
decided that their First Amendment rights were more important than
their present employment 3-a view first articulated in 1892 by then Judge
Oliver Wendell Homes, who said that a policeman might have "a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant
does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well
as idleness by the implied terms of his contract." 4
However, starting in 1952 the Court began to restrict the States'
power to curb public employees' freedom to associate.' These cases,
spanning fifteen years, charted a new course toward greater protection
of public employees, particularly with respect to mandatory loyalty oaths.
Close on the heels of these new-found protections for public em-
ployees the Court addressed restrictions on the freedom of speech of
public employees.
Pickering v. Board of Education,6 a benchmark case, saw the Court's
initial steps in defining workable boundaries for public employees' rights
of freedom of expression. While a local tax proposal was pending, Mr.
Pickering, a high school teacher in Will County, Illinois, wrote a letter
to a local newspaper critical of the Board of Education's handling of
past tax proposals. For writing the letter, the Board fired Mr. Pickering.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that the proper analysis
must "balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees. '" The Pickering Court purposely
formulated its balancing test in broad terms, so that it would be ap-
plicable in a large number of cases.8 The Court identified several factors
to be considered in balancing the conflicting interests: the closeness of
the parties' working relationship, the detrimental effect of the speech
on the employer, the relevancy of the employee's speech to the particular
3. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492, 72 S. Ct. 380, 385 (1952) (upholding
New York laws prohibiting members of certain subversive groups from teaching in public
schools).
4. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892).
5. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605, 87 S. Ct. 675, 685
(1967) (holding unconstitutionally vague New York statutes requiring that teachers sign
anti-communist oath); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192, 73 S. Ct. 215, 219 (1952)
(holding constitutional protection extends to public employees "whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory").
6. 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968).
7. Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35.
8. Id. at 569, 88 S. Ct. at 1735.
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job, and the public's concern with freedom of the given type of speech. 9
The Court concluded that unless the teacher had knowingly made false
or reckless statements, "his right to speak on issues of public importance
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment."' 0
Although Pickering marked the high tide of constitutional protection
extended to public employees in their exercise of free speech, the Court
noted an important limitation:
It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment
in which the need for confidentiality is so great that even com-
pletely correct public statements might furnish a permissible
ground for dismissal. Likewise, positions in public employment
in which the relationship between superior and subordinate is
of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of
public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seri-
ously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship
between them can also be imagined."
Since Pickering, there have been two important eras of refinement
of Pickering's balancing test. During the first era, lasting from Pickering
in 1968 until Connick v. Myers12 in 1983, the Court concerned itself
With fine-tuning the test. At first the Court simply reiterated the Pickering
test.' 3 After firmly establishing that it was critical that public employees
be permitted to criticize their superiors publicly on matters of public
concern,' 4 the Court outlined the burdens of proof to be carried by the
parties. In Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 5 the Court made
the Pickering protection more difficult to obtain by requiring the public
employee to show that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected
under Pickering, and (2) this conduct was a substantial or motivating
factor in the employer's decision to terminate the employee. Even if
the employee carried this burden, the termination .would be upheld if
the employer could show by a preponderance of evidence that the
termination would have occurred anyway, regardless of the protected
9. Id. at 569-72, 88 S. Ct. at 1735-36.
10. Id. at 574, 88 S. Ct. at 1738.
11. Id. at 569 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at 1735 n.3.
12. 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (overturning the Fifth Circuit's decision
that an assistant district attorney's right to free speech had been infringed when she was
fired for circulating an intra-office questionnaire critical of her superior; the Court held
that only public employees' speech on matters of general public concern is protected).
13. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972) (holding that the
failure to renew a college professor's employment contract presented a bona fide consti-
tutional claim, where the school's action was allegedly in retaliation for his expressing a
view not consonant with his employer's before the state legislature).
14. Id. at 597-98, 92 S. Ct. at 2698 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734).
15. 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
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conduct. 6 The final adjustment to the Pickering scales during this first
era extended the public employee's protection to criticism of his or her
superior in private communications. 7 Additional factors to be considered
in a private setting were the time, manner, and place of the confrontation
between the employee and the superior.' 8 At the close of this first post-
Pickering era the Court had reached a logical compromise between the
competing interests by gradual steps.
The second era of post-Pickering refinement began with Connick v.
Myers.' 9 The Supreme Court's latest statement on public employees'
right to speak on matters of public concern represented a sharp retraction
of the protection previously accorded them. 20 The Burger Court's skewing
of the Pickering balance to favor governmental interests bodes ill for
public employees. In the future, such employees should carefully con-
template the possible consequences of publicly or privately criticizing
their superiors, regardless the validity of the criticism.
Elrod v. Burns2' was the Supreme Court's first post-Pickering case
dealing specifically with patronage dismissals. Shortly after assuming
office, Sheriff Elrod, a Democrat, discharged a group of deputies who
were not members of the Democratic Party and who had failed to obtain
sponsorship from one of the party leaders. Justice Brennan, writing for
the plurality, used language closely resembling that of Pickering.22 The
fundamental difference between the two analyses is that EIrod struck a
balance between the competing interests in much more absolute terms
than did Pickering: "[P]atronage dismissals severely restrict political
belief and association. Though there is a vital need for government
efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least
restrictive means for fostering that end." ' 23 In couching the Elrod analysis
16. Id. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576.
17. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S. Ct.
693, 696-97 (1979).
18. Id. at 415 n.4, 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4.
19. 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
20. See generally Developments in the Law-Public Employment: The Constitutional
Rights of Public Employees, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1738 (1984) "The current Court's scale
tips in favor of promoting the efficient provision of public services instead of protecting
unrestricted discourse by public employees on matters of public concern." Id. at 1748-
49 (footnotes omitted). See also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4
(1983) ("But the 'content, form, and context' standard is so vague and manipulable that
Connick may severely limit all criticism by public employees.") (footnotes omitted); Note,
Connick v. Myers: Narrowing The Free Speech Right of Public Employees, 33 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 429, 432 (1984) ("[A]n examination of Connick in the context of previous applications
of the balancing test will reveal a significant narrowing of the rights of public employees.")
(footnotes omitted); Note, Constitutional Law - Supreme Court Restricts First Amendment
Rights of Public Employees - Connick v. Myers, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 831 (1984) ("The Connick
Court is demonstrably less tolerant of employee speech than were earlier Courts.").
21. 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
22. Id. at 372, 96 S. Ct. at 2689.
23. Id.
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in Pickering terminology, the Court clearly indicated that unless a given
public employee engaged in policymaking, the scales were overwhelmingly
tipped in the employee's favor in cases of patronage dismissal. The
Court's reason for such favoritism was its "concern with the impact of
political patronage or political believe [sic] and association [which do]
not occur in the abstract, for political belief and association constitute
the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. 24
Four years later, the Court refined Elrod in Branti v. Finkel.25 In
Branti Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, narrowed the policy-
making exception to Elrod. The Court held that the exception applied
only when "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved." ' 26 The Court concluded that the assistant public de-
fenders in Branti were not within the "policymaking/confidentiality '
27
exception to the Elrod rule. Assistant public defenders' responsibilities
were to serve individuals, not the controlling political party. "To make
his position dependant on political allegiance would undermine rather
than aid his effectiveness. ' 28 Therefore, Branti's narrowing of the Elrod
exception represented an extention of the Elrod rule against patronage
dismissals.
As in Elrod, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.2 9
He reiterated his belief that patronage practices served substantial gov-
ernment interests by carrying out the will of the electorate.30
In summary, it is evident that the freedom of speech cases and the
political patronage cases are closely related. Both Elrod and its progeny,
and the line of cases culminating in Connick find their roots in Pickering.
There exist, however, significant differences between these two branches.
In Connick-type cases involving freedom of speech, the substantial in-
terests of both parties results in a delicate balance of the relevant factors.
In Elrod-type cases involving patronage dismissals, the Supreme Court's
assertion that "political belief and association constitute the core of
those activities protected by the First Amendment"'" results in the scales
being tipped overwhelmingly in the employee's favor, unless the State
can meet the narrow Elrod-Branti exception.
24. Id. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 2681.
25. 445 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
26. Id. at 518, 100 S. Ct. at 1295.
27. For lack of a better description, the term "policymaking-confidentiality" is used
throughout the paper; note, however, Branti's important narrowing of this exception to
the Elrod doctrine.
28. 445 U.S. at 519-20, 100 S. Ct. at 1295.
29. Id. at 521, 100 S. Ct. at 1296 (Powell, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 522-34, 100 S. Ct. at 1296-1303 (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 2681.
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The McBee Opinions
In McBee, the district court had held that Elrod v. Burns protected
plaintiffs Contreras, Hinojosa, Serna, and Spencer from dismissal; Sher-
iff Ybanez therefore could not replace them with his political sup-
porters.3 2 The court additionally held that plaintiff McBee's private
complaint to county officials was protected speech under the First
Amendment.33
On appeal, the original Fifth Circuit panel reversed.34 Judge Garza,
writing for the three judge panel, noted that a "small county" exception
to the Elrod doctrine applied to the four patronage plaintiffs. 5 Due to
the small size of the sheriff's office, the court found that political loyalty
was indispensable to the office's effectiveness. This "small county"
exception is a subpart to the "policymaking/confidentiality" exception
established in Elrod and Branti.3 6 Turning to plaintiff McBee, Judge
Garza wrote that her actions had seriously injured the close working
relationship in the sheriff's office, and that her actions were therefore
unprotected by the First Amendment.37
After originally denying rehearing, the Fifth Circuit in an unusual
move reconsidered and granted rehearing en banc.38 The majority, eleven
of the fifteen judges, vacated and remanded to the district court for
reconsideration in light of Connick v. Myers.3 9
Judge Gee, writing for the en banc majority, so smoothly coalesced
the Elrod patronage dismissal cases and the freedom of speech cases
that their factual and legal distinctions are easily missed. The majority
merged Elrod and Connick in three basic steps.
Surveying the Supreme Court cases discussed above, Judge Gee said
that "the standard to be applied by us in resolving such public employee
discharge or nonrenewal cases as this is the Pickering balancing test.""0
The danger in this assertion is that it is simultaneously correct and
incorrect. Pickering is arguably the origin of both the Elrod-type and
the Connick-type cases. Judge Gee's statement implies a homogeneity
to "public employee discharge or nonrenewal cases" which does not
exist. It is important to distinguish at the outset the situation of the
four patronage employees from that of Deputy McBee; the majority
failed to do so.
32. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 703 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1983).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 846.
35. Id. at 842.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 844-45.
38. For a lively discussion of the "heavy judicial armtwisting" that probably accom-
panied these events, see Baier, Constitutional Law, 31 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1985).
39. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 1014.
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Connick and Elrod were merged further by the citing of Connick
as indicative of the type of factors to be considered in striking a proper
balance.4 This approach suggests that the weight given each factor should
be the same in both Elrod and Connick situations. As the above analysis
of recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrates, this conclusion is in-
correct.
Aware that Elrod and Connick are irreconcilable under a single
"particularized inquiry" test, the majority ingeniously modified its pre-
vious overstatements by reasoning:
Such cases [both associational and speech] might reasonably be
expected to locate themselves on a spectrum; we conclude they
do.
Elrod and Branti, we think, lie at the extreme of the em-
ployee's side, where little, if any, weighing is called for. There
employees who were, it appears, both loyal and effective were
discharged on the sole ground of their private and-for em-
ployment purposes-all but abstract political views. They did
not campaign, they did not even speak: they merely thought.
No countervailing considerations appear; they suffered discharge
for pure political beliefs, a circumstance that explains the com-
parative absence of "weighing" terminology in these opinions. 42
The majority cited cases in which teachers provoked student disturbances
as representing the extreme of the employer's side of the "spectrum. 4
The majority's narrow view of Elrod and Branti is unsupported by
either opinion's language. Nor is its view that Branti narrowed the Elrod
rule shared by the many commentaries which appeared after Branti."
41. Id.
42. Id. (footnotes omitted).
43. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Duke v. North Tex. State
Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Protects Public Employees'
Political Beliefs, 55 Tul. L. Rev. 576, 582 (1981) ("Although the Court in [Brantl purported
to rely upon the holding of Elrod, the test employed to determine whether public employees
could be dismissed on the basis of political affiliation was substantially broader than the
Elrod rule.... By placing an affirmative duty on officials to show that party affiliation
was a necessary requiriment for the effective performance of a public office, the Court
narrowly construed the policymaking and confidential employee exceptions of ElIrod, and
reinforced the Court's recent proscription against patronage firings.") (footnotes omitted);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on Patronage Practice: Branti v. Finkel, 42 La. L. Rev.
310, 319 (1981) ("Arguably, the redefined test broadens the class of protected employees
in that the class of persons whose jobs are realistically related to partisan interests is
smaller than the class of all policymakers."); Note, First Amendment Limitations on
Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 181, 186 (1982) (In Branti v. Finkel
the "Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of patronage dismissals, clarified the prin-
ciples underlying its decision in Elrod, and narrowed Elrod's policy maker exception to
the general proscription against patronage firings.").
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The piece de resistance of the majority's "spectrum" is the place-
ment of Connick and McBee in the same area: "The facts of Connick,
which locate Ms. Myers' situation more centrally on the spectrum, called
forth a reiteration and application by the [Supreme] Court of the Pickering
balance; and so it is with today's case. ' 45 The majority chose not to em-
phasize that the Connick and Pickering plaintiffs were allegedly exercising
their freedom to speak on matters of public concern, whereas the McBee
plaintiffs, except McBee, were allegedly exercising their freedom to asso-
ciate politically. Instead, Judge Gee factually distinguished the four McBee
patronage plaintiffs from the Elrod plaintiffs by noting first that Deputies
Spencer and Contreras did not request rehiring, thus Sheriff Ybanez' fail-
ure to consider them for reinstatement did not violate the First Amend-
ment, and second that Deputies Contreras, Hinojosa, and Serna had put
their political beliefs into action by placing bumper stickers on their au-
tomobiles, and by attending pachangas in support of Ybanez's predeces-
sor.46
The failure of Deputies Spencer and Contreras to request rehiring fairly
precluded them from Elrod's protection. The dissent claimed that the two
did not request rehiring because "[a]pplication would have been futile."147
Nonetheless the majority's holding on this point is the better solution. Oth-
erwise, an employee who quit for any reason could later assert he or she
did not seek reappointment because "[tihe handwriting was on the wall
.... ,,4" If the employee must affirmatively seek reinstatement, both his
position and his employer's position are clarified.
The majority's distinction between Deputies Hinojosa and Serna, on
the one hand, and the Elrod plaintiffs on the other, for putting political be-
liefs into action is untenable. Both political beliefs and associations were
protected in Eirod, not mere abstract beliefs.4 9 Judge Rubin, dissenting in
McBee, stated:
A rule that protects only abstract beliefs is almost meaningless.
Abstract beliefs need little protection. They threaten only those who
cannot tolerate heresy. Words unspoken win no converts. Political
beliefs cherished only in the mind win no elections. The right at
stake in this case is the freedom to associate with the political party
or the politician of one's choice, as well as the freedom to hold the
beliefs of one's intellect. The first amendment does not protect only
freedom of belief or the use of words. It safeguards conduct that
is part of freedom of expression."'
45. 730 F.2d at 1014.
46. Id. at 1015.
47. Id. at 1023 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Rubin, J., dissenting).
49. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357, 96 S. Ct. at 2681.
50. 730 F.2d at 1025 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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Despite the fine distinction the en banc majority drew, McBee, like El-
rod, remains a patronage dismissal case involving the freedom to associate.
Connick, like Pickering, remains an employee criticism case involving the
freedom to speak.
Plaintiff McBee's situation should have been subject to Pickering-Con-
nick balancing; she "was effectively terminated for her complaints to the
county authorities." 5' Deputy McBee's private complaints to local officials
make her the only plaintiff in McBee whose situation is analogous to that
of Ms. Myers, who distributed the questionnaire in Connick.
By casting Elrod and Branti as "pure political belief" cases, the Fifth
Circuit has fused most patronage cases into the government-favored5 2
"particularized balancing" espoused by Justice White in Connick.5 3
After holding Connick's "particularized balancing" applicable to all
the McBee plaintiffs, the majority's next section was titled "Adjusting The
Earlier Tests." 54 Without the benefit of Connick, the majority stated, the
district court and the original panel had applied dated analyses. The Con-
nick "guidepost" was the Supreme Court's 'effort to avoid formulaic re-
sponse' in public employee First Amendment cases." 55
Until McBee, the Fifth Circuit's approach in patronage dismissal cases
where mixed motives for the dismissal were alleged, established in Tanner
v. McCall,5 6 was to ask whether: (1) the employer's conduct had imper-
missibly abridged the employee's first amendment rights, (2) the employee
had met the burden of showing a constitutional infringement, and (3) the
employer had effectively rebutted by showing the decision to dismiss would
have occurred absent the protected conduct.57
According to McBee, Connick did not overrule Tanner, but rather re-
quired a more "expansive and particularistic approach ' 5 8 in the first step
of the analysis. In other words, by failing to mention the Tanner court's
use of Elrod's employee-favored balancing test in the first and most crucial
step of the Tanner analysis,5 9 the McBee court took another opportunity to
shift patronage cases into Connick's employer-favored test.
In the final section of the opinion, "Pickering Applied," 60 the McBee
majority reiterated the necessity for a "particularized inquiry" into each
plaintiff's case. 6' Although the majority said "Pickering and its progeny do
51. Id. at 1015 (Footnotes omitted).
52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
53. 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S. Ct. at 1692.
54. 730 F.2d at 1015.
55. Id. at 1016 (quoting Gonzalez v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 1983)).
56. 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding dismissed deputies had not proved
patronage was a motivating or substantial factor in defendant's decision).
57. Id. at 1190.
58. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1016.
59. 625 F.2d at 1189.
60. 730 F.2d at 1016.
61. Id.
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not prescribe a fixed set of factors, ' 62 it listed several "relevant" factors
to be weighed in the balance, only one of which favors employees. 63 In va-
cating and remanding to the district court the majority concluded: "To
conduct the particularized inquiry mandated by Connick in this case will
require evaluation of the record with these considerations in mind and may
require further development of the facts." '64 Ironically, by instructing the
district court to keep "these considerations in mind" the majority perhaps
implied that its list of relevant factors was an exclusive one. This would
contradict the majority's description of Connick's rationale: 'to avoid
formulaic response' in public employee First Amendment cases. '61
Judge Rubin, joined by Judges Randall and Higginbotham, opened the
dissent by restating the Elrod doctrine: "Political belief, association, and
activity are at the core of the activities protected by the first amend-
ment." 66 Judge Rubin chided the majority for vacating findings of fact made
by the district court without determining that those findings were "clearly
erroneous.' '67
The dissent distinguished Elrod's patronage doctrine from Connick.
Judge Rubin stated that the majority had mischaracterized Branti v. Finkel
as a narrowing of Elrod,68 when in fact "the Branti Court did not limit but
extended Elrod to prohibit dismissal 'of a public employee solely because
of his private political beliefs.' ",69 In finding Elrod and not Connick ap-
plicable to the four McBee patronage employees, Judge Rubin wrote:
We do not need to guess at [Connick's] holding, the [Supreme]
Court stated it:
"We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a cit-
izen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters of personal interest, absent the most unusual circum-
stances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. '71
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1016-17.
64. Id. at 1017.
65. Id. at 1016 (quoting Gonzalez, 712 F.2d at 147).
66. Id. at 1017 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.
Ct. 2673 (1976)).
67. Id. at 1018.
68. Id. at 1020 (Rubin, J., dissenting). The majority stated that in Branti "Justice
Stevens appeared to narrow the Elrod rule significantly." Id. at 1012. See also supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
69. 730 F.2d at 1020 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 100
S. Ct. at 1294).
70. 730 F.2d at 1021 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103
S. Ct. at 1690).
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The critical distinction which the majority failed to recognize between
Elrod and McBee, on the one hand, and Connick on the other is that:
Elrod and Branti, like this case, involved retaliation for political
beliefs and associations-free expression that did not threaten the
efficient conduct of public office unless the employees' position re-
quired political loyalty. Pickering, like Connick and similar pre-
Connick cases, involved speech that arguably threatened the integ-
rity of employer-employee relations, and therefore each case re-
quired the interests to be balanced anew.
7
'
Although Judge Rubin's analysis did not find Elrod's roots in Pick-
ering, it is not contrary to this article's basic theme-both advocate making
a distinction between cases involving the freedom to speak and those deal-
ing with the freedom to associate.
The dissent applied the Elrod test to the deputies other than Deputy
McBee, concluding that their First Amendment rights had been abridged.
7 2
Since McBee had protested to county officials, the dissent said that the
Pickering-Connick balancing test should have governed.73 McBee's com-
plaint about the patronage dismissals of public employees was clearly a
matter of public concern. 74 The complaint was appropriately made, and did
not approach the "mini-insurrection" caused by Ms. Myers' questionnaire
in Connick.7 1 Judge Rubin concluded that McBee's speech was protected
"not only because it was free speech, but also because it was manifestly a
petition for the redress of a grievance from the only governmental body able
to afford relief.' 76
Judge Rubin's well-crafted dissent apparently did not find the major-
ity's "spectrum" objectionable, only its failure to correctly distinguish an
Elrod fact pattern (the four patronage plaintiffs) from a Connick fact pat-
tern (Deputy McBee).
Although Judge Tate concurred in the majority's result, he noted that
Judge Rubin's dissent was difficult to fault. 77 He concurred in the result only
because he believed that the case fell within the "small county" exception
to the Elrod-Branti doctrine as expressed by the original panel and the
Fourth Circuit in Ramey v. Harber . 7
In Ramey v. Harber, the Fourth Circuit did "take notice of the inti-
mate relationship that undoubtedly exists between the sheriff and his de-
puties in a small county like Lee County, Virginia." ' 79 However, the Ramey
71. 730 F.2d at 1022 (Rubin, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
72. Id. at 1022.
73. Id. at 1024.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id at 1025 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Tate, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 1026 (citing Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978)).
79. 589 F.2d at 756.
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Court did not rely on this rationale to decide the case: "IFlor the purposes
of disposing of this litigation, we assume without deciding that Elrod is ap-
plicable." ' 0 Ramey, therefore, did not truly represent a "small county" ex-
ception to the Elrod-Branti doctrine.
If the "small county" exception is premised on the Branti requirement
"that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective per-
formance of the public office involved," ' 8' it is faithful to the Elrod-Branti
doctrine. If it is instead based on the number of people in the office or
county, nothing supports denying employees the benefit of Elrod's protec-
tion. Mr. Pickering would not have been denied the right to speak on mat-
ters of public concern had he taught at a small school or in a small county.
Historically, political beliefs and association have enjoyed greater protec-
tion than Mr. Pickering's speech. Denying public employees Elrod's pro-
tection because they work in a small office or county is inconsistent with
this greater protection.
Other Circuits' Approaches
All the federal circuits have applied the Pickering balance to free speech
cases,12 and some have had at least one opportunity to apply the post-Con-
nick balancing test.83 However, fewer patronage cases have been reported.14
The smaller number of cases probably results from the restricted fact pat-
terns giving rise to patronage dismissals, coupled with the employee's hur-
dle in proving employer motive.
The Fourth Circuit recently held that non-confidential, non-policy-
making public employees "enjoy the protection of the Elrod-Branti prin-
ciple." 5 This decision came after McBee, and did not cite Connick. Six years
earlier, before Connick or Branti, the Fourth Circuit had noted a possible
"small county" exception to Elrod.86 Judge Tate's concurrence87 and the
original McBee panel88 adopted this exception. Judge Tate's opinion im-
plies a conflict between the Fourth Circuit's "small county" exception and
80. Id. at 757.
81. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S. Ct. at 1287.
82. See, e.g., Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Waters v. Chaffin,
684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1982); Monsanto v. Quinn, 674 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1982).
83. See, e.g., Zook v. Brown, 748 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Central
Point School Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County,
745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984).
84. Over 200 cases from the Federal Courts of Appeals specifically apply the Pickering
free speech balance. But fewer than 50 cases specifically apply the Elrod patronage doctrine.
See, e.g., England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1984); Lasco v. Northern, 733
F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984).
85. Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1984).
86. Ramey, 589 F.2d at 756-57.
87. 730 F.2d at 1026 (Tate, J., concurring).
88. 703 F.2d at 842.
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the McBee majority's rejection of that concept.89 Since Ramey's "small
county" exception was only dictum, 90 this conflict is more apparent than
real. The conflict calling for Supreme Court intervention lies in McBee's
"particularized inquiry" approach, while the other circuits do not rely on
Connick to analyze patronage dismissals.
The Seventh Circuit's novel approach to patronage cases combines two
versions of the Pickering test. 91 First, if the employee is unable to show that
he was dismissed solely because of his political beliefs, the court applies the
three-part Mount Healthy test to determine whether party affiliation was a
motivating factor in the dismissal. 92 If the answer is "yes," then the Mount
Healthy test is again applied to determine whether the employer-defendant
can effectively rebut the presumption thus established by showing that the
dismissal would have occurred regardless of the protected conduct. 93 If the
answer is "no," then the traditional Pickering balance is applied to deter-
mine whether the State's interests outweigh the infringement of the em-
ployee's freedom of political association. 94
Barnes v. Bosley, 95 a 1984 Eighth Circuit patronage dismissal case, ex-
plained Pickering's inapplicability to patronage cases and the close rela-
tionship between Pickering and Elrod:
The Pickering balancing test need not be used in determining
whether the first amendment protects political affiliation. In El-
rod, the Supreme Court struck the balance between the govern-
ment's interest in efficient management and the public employee's
interest in free political association. The Court held that political
affiliation is always protected unless the employee occupies a po-
sition that requires a political viewpoint which is in harmony with
89. 730 F.2d at 1026 (Tate, J., concurring). See also Baier, supra note 36, at 17
("In defense of his isolated opinion, Judge Tate, undaunted, pointed his finger at the
views of the Fourth Circuit [expressed in Ramey] which we all know is a flag to the
Supreme Court.") (footnotes omitted).
90. See Ramey, 589 F.2d at 756-57. See also Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th
Cir. 1984).
Aside from the fact that the small-size distinction in Ramey was entirely by
way of dictum, Branti, which followed Ramey, held that raw patronage dis-
charges in a nine-person public defender's office were not justified under the
Elrod test as therein modified. To the extent, therefore, that the Ramey small-
size distinction may have had any vitality when decided under Elrod, we believe
it has since been completely undercut by Branti's refinement of the Elrod
principle.
727 F.2d at 1338 n.14.
91. Wren v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1980); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798
(7th Cir. 1983).
92. Wren, 635 F.2d at 1283.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1286.
95. 745 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that public employees who supported their
superior's predecessor were protected under Elrod, and that Pickering was inapplicable).
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the viewpoint of his or her supervisor. 96
Barnes' resolution of Pickering and Elrod explains the similarities in
the language of the two cases, and lends some credence to the McBee
"spectrum" theory. Left unexplained is why the McBee majority placed the
McBee patronage employees under Connick instead of under Elrod. The
distinction between the McBee plaintiffs' political beliefs with limited po-
litical activities and the Elrod plaintiffs' "pure political beliefs ' 97 is so fine
as to border on invisibility. "A rule that protects only abstract beliefs is al-
most meaningless." 98
Conclusion
Barnes' logic is undeniable. It succinctly distinguishes Pickering from
Elrod. It reconciles McBee's majority and dissent by keeping the "spec-
trum" intact, but moves patronage dismissals based on political beliefs and
activities from Connick's balance to Elrod's analysis. The Elrod-Branti ex-
ception for certain persons in confidential and policymaking positions re-
mains viable. Although both the majority and dissent rejected the "small
county" exception to the Elrod-Branti analysis,99 the size of an office or
county may be relevant in considering the confidentiality/policymaking ex-
ception. It is unlikely that the Fifth Circuit will soon adopt Barnes' rea-
soning, as the very recent McBee majority numbered eleven strong.
Supreme Court intervention in the area of patronage dismissals ap-
pears likely due to the Circuits' increasingly different approaches. In light
of Connick's favoring of governmental interests, the current Court might
find McBee's reasoning persuasive. If so, a final caveat to the "spectrum"
analysis would be appropriate. Placing individual cases with their myriad
fact patterns on a single continuum is a risky business. Jurisprudence is
fraught with factual distinctions of cases from prior precedent. Mention of
this danger is made only to emphasize the fragility of any test adopted in
so complex an area as Constitutional Law.
Supreme Court adoption of the Barnes' analysis would maintain a con-
sistent line of patronage case law. Barnes, more than McBee, reflects the
Elrod principle that "political belief and association constitute the core of
those activities protected by the First Amendment."'10 Where patronage is
not the "sole" reason for dismissal, Tanner's three-step analysis delegating
the burden of proof to be carried by each party is appropriate."' This ap-
proach would lessen the danger faced by plaintiffs who would be placed on
the Connick balance under the McBee analysis once their case is found not
96. Id. at 506.
97. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014.
98. Id. at 1025 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1016; id. at 1023 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
100. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 2681 (footnote omitted).
101. Tanner, 625 F.2d at 1190.
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to be on "all fours" with Elrod.
The Barnes court understood that nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
public employees' political beliefs and activities should be protected. To hold
otherwise, the Court would lend credence to Justice Powell's dissent in both
Elrod and Branti that patronage is a traditional practice that serves a sub-
stantial governmental interest by reflecting the will of the people.10 2 In
Gannon v. Daley,"'3 Judge Prentice Marshall recognized that there is an-
other practice enjoying a richer history and serving a greater public pur-
pose:
It is certainly true that a fundamental premise of American gov-
ernment is the rule of the majority. But that is not the fundamental
premise of American constitutionalism. The Constitution exists not
to protect majorities, which usually can take care of themselves,
but to protect minorities from the excesses of the majority. The
constitutional right to choose one's political associations and ex-
ercise one's political beliefs is a precious one, fully secured against
majorities precisely to ensure that in the long run political insti-
tutions reflect the will of the people. 14
These words cannot be dismissed as simply the whistling of an idealogue in
the dark. They represent an essential precept for preserving the core values
of the First Amendment. Freedom to believe and associate politically as one
chooses lies at the heart of the Constitution. Elrod and Branti are true to
this concept; so too is Barnes.*
J. Kendall Rathburn
102. Branli, 445 U.S. at 522, 100 S. Ct. at 1296-1297 (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod,
427 U.S. at 376-77, 96 S. Ct. at 2691 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. 561 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. 111. 1983).
104. Id. at 1389.
* On April 29, 1985 United States District Judge Kazen's opinion was filed. McBee
v. Jim Hogg County, Civil Action No. L-81-3 (S.D. Tex. 1985). The salient features of
the opinion were as follows:
(1) The court readopted its original findings and conclusions, and denied de-
fendant's request to introduce further evidence.
(2) Plaintiff Contreras's failure, as an ex-employee, to expressly apply for reap-
pointment was fatal to his First Amendment claim; plaintiff Spencer was
not an ex-employee and was not precluded from her claim.
(3) Based on the requisite particularized inquiry plaintiffs Serna's, Hinojosa's
and Spencer's "freedom of political belief and association is a matter of
highest public concern." Defendants were unjustified in the reaction taken
to the exercise of these freedoms.
(4) Based on a similar balancing of all the Connick-McBee factors, Deputy
McBee's freedom of speech was constitutionally protected.
(5) As a result, four of the original five plaintiffs were reinstated retroactively
to October 29, 1981, the date of the original judgment.
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